Whether the award will be set aside or not is a different question and that has to be decided by the appropriate Court. In this appeal, this Court is concerned only with the question whether by allowing the amendment, as prayed for by the appellan..

Whether the award will be set aside or not is a different question and that has to be decided by the appropriate Court. In this appeal, this Court is concerned only with the question whether by allowing the amendment, as prayed for by the appellant, the Court will allow material facts to be brought on record in the pending setting aside proceeding.  Judging the case from this angle, this Court is of the opinion that in the interest of justice and considering the fairness of procedure, the Court should allow the appellant to bring those materials on record as those materials are not wholly irrelevant or they may have a bearing on the appellant’s plea for setting aside the award.  Nothing said in this judgment will be construed as even remotely expressing any opinion on the legality 29of the award. That question will be decided by the Court where setting aside proceeding is pending. The proceeding for setting aside the award may be disposed of as early as possible, preferably within 4 months. For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal succeeds. The order of the High Court is set aside and that of the court below is restored. No order as to costs.

Arbitration and Concilation Act, 1996

In view of the foregoing, this appeal is allowed and the order of the Designate is set aside. The application under Show

In view of the foregoing, this appeal is allowed and the order of the Designate is set aside. The application under section 11 of the Act filed by appellant before the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court is allowed and Justice P.K.Bahri (Retd.) who was the earlier Arbitrator is appointed as the sole arbitrator to decide the appellant’s claim in regard to the additional cost for completing the work. It is open to the respondent to raise all contentions against the claim of the appellant including the contention of limitation, maintainability and res judicata, before the arbitrator. Nothing in this order shall be construed as expression of any opinion on the merits or tenability of the claim of the appellant regarding extra cost.

In light of the discussions made above we find the impugned order of the Bombay High Court unsustainable. The High Court was clearly in error not correctly following the decision of this Court in Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors and in tak..

In light of the discussions made above we find the impugned order of the Bombay High Court unsustainable. The High Court was clearly in error not correctly following the decision of this Court in Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors and in taking a contrary view. The High Court overlooked that what section 31(5) contemplates is not merely the delivery of any kind of a copy of the award but a copy of the award that is duly signed by the members of the arbitral tribunal. In the facts of the case the appellants would appear to be deriving undue advantage due to the omission of the arbitrator to give them a signed copy of the award coupled with the supply of a copy of the award to them by the claimant-respondent but that would not change the legal position and it would be wrong to tailor the law according to the facts of a particular case. In the light of the discussion made above this appeal must succeed. We, accordingly, set aside the judgments and orders passed by the Bombay High Court and the Principal District Judge, Latur. The application made by the appellants under section 34 of the Act is restored before the Principal District Judge, Latur, who shall now proceed to hear the parties on merits and pass an order on the application in accordance with law. Since the 1matter is quite old, it is hoped and expected that the Principal District Judgewill dispose this matter preferably within 6 months from the date of receipt of this order. 

In the course of arguments before us, on behalf of the appellant certain names of retired High Court Judges were indicated to the senior counsel for the Corporation for appointment as sole arbitrator but the Corporation did not agree to any of the..

In the course of arguments before us, on behalf of the appellant certain names of retired High Court Judges were indicated to the senior counsel for the Corporation for appointment as sole arbitrator but the Corporation did not agree to any of the names proposed by the appellant. In the circumstances, we are left with no choice but to send the matter back to the Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court for an appropriate order on the application made by the dealer under Section 11(6). Civil Appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned order is set aside. Arbitration Case No. 107 of 2004, M/s. Deep Trading Company 12Page 13 v. M/s. Indian Oil Corporation and others, is restored to the file of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad for fresh consideration by the Chief Justice or the designate Judge, as the case may be, in accordance with law and in light of the observations made above. No costs.

Arbitration and Concilation Act, 1996

Having held that the Official Liquidator had failed to discharge the duty cast on him in terms of the second proviso to Show

Having held that the Official Liquidator had failed to discharge the duty cast on him in terms of the second proviso to Section 394(1) of the Act, the next issue that requires consideration is whether sanction of a scheme of amalgamation can be held up merely because the conduct of an Official Liquidator is found to be blameworthy? We are of the view that it will neither be proper nor feasible to lay down absolute parameters in this behalf. The effect of misdemeanor on the part of the official liquidator on the scheme as such would depend on the facts obtaining in each case and ordinarily the Company Judge should be the final arbiter on that issue. In the instant case, indubitably, the findings in the report under Section 209A of the Act were placed before the Company Judge, and he had considered the same while sanctioning the scheme of amalgamation. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Company Judge had, before him, all material facts which had a direct bearing on the sanction of the amalgamation scheme, despite the afore stated lapse on the part of the Official Liquidator. In this view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the Company Judge, having examined all material facts, was justified in sanctioning the scheme of amalgamation, particularly when the current investigation under Section 235 of the Act was initiated pursuant to a complaint filed by respondent 3No.1 subsequent to the order of the Company Judge sanctioning the scheme. For the foregoing reasons, the appeals are allowed; and the impugned judgment is set aside. Consequently, the order passed by the Company Judge sanctioning the scheme of amalgamation is restored. However, it is made clear that the scheme of amalgamation will not come in the way of any civil or criminal proceedings which may arise pursuant to the action initiated under Sections 209A or 235 of the Act, or any criminal proceedings filed by respondent No. 1. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. 

When we consider the facts of the present case bearing in mind the definition aforesaid, we find that the contract in question is not a spot delivery contract. True it is that by letter dated 30th of October, 1987 written by Tuhin to Bhagwati, he ..

When we consider the facts of the present case bearing in mind the definition aforesaid, we find that the contract in question is not a spot delivery contract. True it is that by letter dated 30th of October, 1987 written by Tuhin to Bhagwati, he had stated that the formal agreement had been executed between them on 10th November, 1986 and as per the agreement he is transferring the entire 3530 shares of Peerless purchased from the loan amount and the transfer is in its repayment. However, the agreement dated 21st November, 1994 between Bhagwati and Tuhin which formed part of the compromise decree provides that the sale of shares took place on 30th October, 1987 and in 32Page 33consideration thereof Bhagwati paid a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs on 21st November, 1994 and further the dividend on the entire shares up to the accounting year 1989-90 amounting to Rs.8,64,850 to be retained by Tuhin. In the face of it, the plea of Bhagwati that the payment of Rs. 10 lakh was made to buy peace, is not fit to be accepted and in fact, that forms part of the consideration for the sale of shares. Once we take this view, the plea of the appellant that it is a spot delivery contract is fit to be rejected. We agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the Company Law Board and the High Court on this issue.

The High Court, in our opinion, without getting the matter enquired into could not have opined that it was a clear cut case of sexual harassment of the writ petitioner and on that basis directed initiation of a disciplinary action in the manner as..

The High Court, in our opinion, without getting the matter enquired into could not have opined that it was a clear cut case of sexual harassment of the writ petitioner and on that basis directed initiation of a disciplinary action in the manner as has been done in paragraph 8 noticed (supra).  We, in modification, of the order passed by the High Court direct that as no complaint committee has been constituted, which was imperative in character, the High Court may appoint a Three Members Committee headed by a Lady and in the event it is found that the writ petitioner was subjected to sexual harassment, the report thereof may be sent to the army authorities for initiation of a disciplinary action against the appellants herein on the basis thereof. All the expenditures which may be incurred in this behalf may be borne by the Army Authorities.

Constitution of India, 1951

In R.L. Gupta v. Jupitor General Insurance Co. [1990(1) SCC 356] it was held the quantum of liability is provided by the Statute prospectively. At the relevant point of time the quantum of Rs.15,000/- appears to have been paid. The High Court&rsqu..

In R.L. Gupta v. Jupitor General Insurance Co. [1990(1) SCC 356] it was held the quantum of liability is provided by the Statute prospectively. At the relevant point of time the quantum of Rs.15,000/- appears to have been paid. The High Court’s view about retrospective operation is contrary 3to what has been stated in R.L. Gupta’s case (supra). In any event, Act can have no application in respect of a claim  petition filed on 30.11.1982 and decided by MACT on 16.7.1984.  Above being the position the appeal deserves to be allowed, which we direct. The amount shall be Rs.15,000/- instead of Rs.50,000/- asdirected by the Tribunal. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. 

Motor Vehicle Act, 1988

we set aside the judgment and order of the High Court as also the First Appellate Court and restore the judgment and order of the Trial Court which had been pleased to dismiss the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondents No.1 to 7. The Trial Court,..

we set aside the judgment and order of the High Court as also the First Appellate Court and restore the judgment and order of the Trial Court which had been pleased to dismiss the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondents No.1 to 7. The Trial Court, however, had decreed the suit for return of the money of Rs.17,500/- to the predecessor of respondents No.1 to 7 and also interest was ordered to be paid on this amount by the vendor-respondent No.8. Since the respondent No.8 had already been divested of his title to execute a sale deed in favour of respondent Nos.1 to 7 as he had already executed a deed of gift in favour of the appellant-trust for charitable purpose, we are of the view that in the interest of equity, he should not be saddled with the financial liability to return the amount of Rs.17,500/- with interest to the respondent Nos.1-7. This amount, in our view, in the interest of equity 2and fair play should be paid by the appellant-trust to the respondent Nos.1-7 on behalf of Respondent No.8, as this part of the decree which had been passed by the Trial Court in favour of respondent Nos. 1-7 had not been challenged by way of an appeal by the respondent No.8. But as we have held that the appellant-trust is the rightful owner of the disputed plot and the Respondent No.8 as a consequence has been held to have been divested of the property, the amount paid by the predecessor of Respondent Nos.1-7, should be refunded to Respondent Nos.1-7 without interest and thus the decree of the Trial Court shall be treated as modified to this extent. This appeal accordingly is allowed, without any order as to costs.

In the present case, the person who was called to prove the document himself said that he had not signed as an identifying witness in respect of Ext. B2 and moreover he stated that he did not know about the signature in Ex. B2. The contents of the..

In the present case, the person who was called to prove the document himself said that he had not signed as an identifying witness in respect of Ext. B2 and moreover he stated that he did not know about the signature in Ex. B2. The contents of the document were not proved as was required to be done. Taking all the factors as stated hereinbefore into consideration and also noticing the fact that execution of the Will, which was executed on the same day as that of the Gift Deed, we hold that even the said document is found to be of suspicious nature and therefore the said deed is also held to be not duly proved. .Consequently, no interference is called for to the findings recorded by both the appellate courts below to the effect that the appellant has failed to prove that the said deed of gift was executed by deceased Chathu. That apart both the appellate courts below have found that both the documents namely the Deed of Gift as also Deed of Will suffer from suspicious circumstances. The said findings are concurrent findings of fact which should not be normally interfered with by the Court by exercising the power under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

(1) The appellant is not a bona fide purchaser and is, therefore, not protected against specific performance of the contract between the plaintiffs and the owner defendants in the suit. (2) The transfer in favour of the appellant pendente lite is ..

(1) The appellant is not a bona fide purchaser and is, therefore, not protected against specific performance of the contract between the plaintiffs and the owner defendants in the suit. (2) The transfer in favour of the appellant pendente lite is effective in transferring title to the appellant but such title shall remain subservient to the rights of the plaintiff in the suit and subject to any direction which the Court may eventually pass therein. Since the appellant has purchased the entire estate that forms the subject matter of the suit, the appellant is entitled to be added as a party defendant to the suit. (4) The appellant shall as a result of his addition raise and pursue only such defenses as were available and taken by the original defendants and none other With the above additions, I agree with the order proposed by my Esteemed Brother, M.Y. Eqbal, J. that this 
appeal be allowed and the appellant added as party defendant to the suit in question. 

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties. In our considered opinion, the learned single judge has completely misconstrued the provisions of Show

We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties. In our considered opinion, the learned single judge has completely misconstrued the provisions of Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC and has committed serious error in deciding the scope of Section 53A of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC. As noticed above the Civil Judge while granting ad-interim injunction very categorically observed in the order that respective rights of the parties shall be decided at the time of final disposal of the suit. The very fact that Plaintiff No.2 is in possession of the property as a tenant under Plaintiff No.1 and possession of Plaintiff No.2 was not denied, the interim protection was given to Plaintiff No.2 against the threatened action of the defendants to evict her without following the 5Page 6 due process of law. In our considered opinion, the order passed by the learned single judge cannot be sustained in law. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow this appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court in the aforesaid appeal arising out of the order of injunction. However, before parting with the order we are of the view that since the suit is pending for a long time the trial court shall hear and dispose of the suit within a period of four months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. It goes without saying that the trial court shall not be influenced by any of the observation made in the order passed by the appellate court as also by this court and the suit shall be decided on its own merits. 

We have elaborately discussed the various legal principles and indicated that the expression ‘licensee’ in Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act would take a gratuitous licensee as well. The reason for such an interpretation h..

We have elaborately discussed the various legal principles and indicated that the expression ‘licensee’ in Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act would take a gratuitous licensee as well. The reason for such an interpretation has been elaborately discussed in the earlier part of the judgment. We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the reasoning of the Full Bench of the High Court. In such  circumstances, the appeals lack merits and are, therefore, dismissed. There is no order as to costs.

The University has to live the role of Loco Parentis and show its concern to redress the grievances in proper perspective. Not for nothing Ralph Waldo Emerson had said “the secret of education is respecting pupil”. Thus, the necessity ..

The University has to live the role of Loco Parentis and show its concern to redress the grievances in proper perspective. Not for nothing Ralph Waldo Emerson had said “the secret of education is respecting pupil”. Thus, the necessity of the visually impaired students 1Page 15 should have primacy in the mind of the Empowered Committee of the University. Education for visually impaired students is a great hope for them and such a hope is the brightest bliss in their lives. History has recorded with pride that some men with visual impairment have shown high intellectual prowess. The anguish and despondency in the life of Milton, the famous English poet, did not deter him to carry out the mission of his life. Lack of vision could not destroy his Will power. Needless to say that he had the support of the society. The ancient sage “Ashtavakra” while laying down the traffic rules had categorically stated that the blind man has the first right on the road. Thus, emphasis has always been laid on the visually impaired persons for many a reason. When we say so, we may not be understood to have said that otherwise impaired or disabled people are to be treated differently in the constitutional and statutory scheme. We have only laid emphasis on the visually impaired students for the purpose of present case. It is the need of the present time that the University shall look into the matter and mitigate the grievances of the visually impaired students as far as possible. We have already indicated that we are not experts. But we are disposed to think that the problem has remained unsolved. The same is required to be addressed to in an apposite manner. We do not intend to say that it has not at all been addressed but there has to be more focus, more empathy and more sensitivity. Therefore, we permit the appellant-organisation to submit a representation indicating its grievances and the views to the said Committee within three days which shall be dealt with by the Committee within a week hence.

Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights
and Full Participation) Act, 1995

Constitution of India

Court revealed that  no hesitation in holding that disparaging remarks, as recorded by the learned single Judge, are not necessary for arriving at the decision which he has rendered, the same being not an integral part and further that could ..

Court revealed that  no hesitation in holding that disparaging remarks, as recorded by the learned single Judge, are not necessary for arriving at the decision which he has rendered, the same being not an integral part and further that could not have been done when the appellant was not a party before the court and also he was never afforded an opportunity to explain his conduct, and the affirmation of the same by the Division Bench on the foundation that it has not caused any prejudice and he can fully defend himself when a subsequent litigation is instituted, are legally unacceptable. Accordingly, we expunge the extracted remarks hereinbefore and also any remarks which have 24 (2007) 3 SCC 587 Page 22 22 been made that are likely to affect the reputation of the appellant. Since, the appeal is confined only to expunging of adverse remarks, the same is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

Constitution of India, 1952

The specific case of the appellant before this Court is that the respondent is governed by the provisions of the Show

The specific case of the appellant before this Court is that the respondent is governed by the provisions of the Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972 forming part of the Fundamental Rules and Supplementary Rules, though the question as to whether r. 63 of the 1972 Rules is also applicable to the respondent was not specifically urged by the appellant- institute before the High Court. [para 10 and 13] 1.2 Rule 63 of the Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules 1972 mandates that if a Government servant resigns or retires from service or otherwise quits service without returning to duty after a period of study leave or within a period of three years after such return to duty or fails to complete the course of study and is, thus, unable to furnish the certificates as required under sub-rule (5) of Rule 53, he shall be required to refund the actual amount of leave salary, study allowance, cost of fees, travelling and other expenses, if any, incurred by the Government of India. The provision has a laudable object to achieve. The purpose of granting study leave with salary and other benefits is for the interest of the Institution and also the person concerned so that once he comes back and joins the institute, the students will be benefited by the knowledge and expertise acquired by the person at the expense of the institute. [para 14-15] 1.3 A candidate who avails of leave but takes no interest to complete the course and does not furnish the certificate to that effect, is doing a disservice to the institute as well as to its students. Such a person only enjoys the period of study leave without doing any work at the institute and, at the same time, enjoys the salary and other benefits, which is evidentially not in public interest. Public money cannot be spent unless there is mutual benefit. [para 15] 1.4 In the instant case, there is no clear cut provision in the bond either expressly referring to Rule 63 or strictly imposing a condition that if a candidate fails to complete the course study during the period of sanctioned leave, he will have to refund to the Institute the total amount of leave, salary and other benefits availed of by him during the period of study leave. However, such a specific provision was incorporated in bond by the Board of GovernOTHERS of the appellant-institute in its 22nd meeting held on 28.06.2002. [para 10-11] 1.5 The appellant-Institute has already recovered an amount of Rs.6.5 lacs from the salary and arrears of salary of the respondent and claims balance amount of Rs.6,18,000/-.

the law confers on every person an inherent right to bring a suit of civil nature of one's choice, at one's peril, howsoever frivolous the claim may be, unless it is barred by a statute. [Para 13] [1150 E-G] Smt. Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar &..

the law confers on every person an inherent right to bring a suit of civil nature of one's choice, at one's peril, howsoever frivolous the claim may be, unless it is barred by a statute. [Para 13] [1150 E-G] Smt. Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar & Ors. (1974) 2 SCC 393 and Dhannalal v Kalawatibai and Ors. (2002) 6 SCC 16 - relied on. 1.2. Rule of pleadings postulate that a plaint must contain material facts. When the plaint read as a whole does not disclose material facts giving rise to a cause of action which can be entertained by a civil court, it may be rejected in terms of Order 7, Rule 11 of CPC. Similarly, a plea of bar to jurisdiction of a civil court has to be considered having regard to the contentions raised in the plaint. For the said purpose, averments disclosing cause of action and the reliefs sought for therein must be considered in their entirety and the court would not be justified in determining the question, one way or the other, only having regard to the reliefs claimed de'hors the factual averments made in the plaint. [Para 16] [1151-E,F,G] Church of North India v. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai and Ors. (2005) 10 SCC 760 - relied on. 1.3. Under s.24 of CPC, the High Court has jurisdiction to suo motu withdraw a suit or appeal, pending in any court subordinate to it, to its file and adjudicate itself on the issues involved therein and dispose of the same. Unless the High Court decides to transfer the suit or the appeal, as the case may be, to some other court or the same court, it is obliged to try, adjudicate and dispose of the same. The High Court is competent to dispose of the suit on preliminary issues, as contemplated in Order 14 Rule 1 and 2 of CPC, which may include the issues with regard to maintainability of the suit. If the High Court is convinced that the plaint read as a whole does not disclose any cause of action, it may reject the plaint in terms of Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC. [Para 17] [1151-51 H,A,B,C] 1.4. If on a meaningful - not formal - reading of the plaint, it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, the court should exercise its power - under the said provision. And if clever drafting has created an illusion of a cause of action, it should be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order X CPC. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the suit has to be disposed of either by the High Court or by the courts subordinate to it in a meaningful manner as per the procedure prescribed in the CPC and not on one's own whims. [Para 17] [1152 C-E] T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal and ANOTHER (1977) 4 SCC 467 - relied on. 2.1 In the instant case, when the transferred suits and the appeals came up for consideration before the High Court, it, without passing any order on the application preferred by the appellants for recall of the ex-parte transfer order, dismissed the suits on the ground that the issues raised in the suits were being examined in the writ petition. The procedure adopted by the High Court is unknown to law. The object of filing of the suits could be a dubious and indirect attempt on the part of respondent No.4, to derive some undue advantage in connivance with the appellants, yet that was no ground to dismiss the suits summarily in the aforenoted manner. [Para 18] [1152,F,G,H, 1153 AB] 2.2 One of the fundamental norms of judicial process is that arguable questions either legal or factual, should not be summarily dismissed without recording a reasoned order. Mere entertaining of the writ petition, to which the appellants were not parties, even if it involved determination of similar issues was not a good ground to dismiss the two suits without granting opportunity to the parties to prove their respective stands.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The Government on 8.10.1996 passed an order in pursuance of the direction given by the High Court rejecting the application of the applicant, same was challenged after inordinate delay i.e. on 27.4.2003 ..

Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The Government on 8.10.1996 passed an order in pursuance of the direction given by the High Court rejecting the application of the applicant, same was challenged after inordinate delay i.e. on 27.4.2003 by the writ petitioner, therefore, the writ petition was hopelessly belated. [Para 8] [582-A-B] 1.2. The High Court has rightly affirmed the objection of the respondents. When the application of the writ petitioner under Rule 39 was rejected on 8.10.1996 by the State Government pursuant to the direction given by the High Court, the writ petitioner waited up to 27.4.2003 and filed a belated writ petition. But strangely enough, the writ petition was entertained and an interim order was passed and it was not interfered despite the State Government raising an objection. It was only when the third party who felt aggrieved by the said interim order because the writ petitioner on account of this interim order started interfering with his area, that the matter was entertained by the High Court and it was clubbed up together. There was no justification for the writ petitioner to have waited for a long time. Once the order was passed on 8.10.1996, then there was no need for the writ petitioner to have waited for such a long time. Thus, Court is in full agreement with the view taken by the High Court. However, the High Court despite the fact that the writ petition was belated and suffered from laches entered into the controversy on the merits also and took the view that when Rule 39 was deleted within four weeks of the direction to the State Government to dispose of the application of the writ petitioner, there was no option with the Collector but to reject the application as the rule which was in force was repealed, therefore, the basis on which the order was passed was knocked out. Therefore, the High Court declined to grant any relief to the writ petitioner and dismissed the writ petition on merit also. [Para 8] [582-B-E] 1.3 So far as the question of delay is concerned, no hard and first rule can be laid down and it will depend on the facts of each case. In the present case, the facts stare at the face of it that on 8.10.1996 an order was passed by the Collector pursuant to the order passed by the High Court, rejecting the application of writ petitioner for consideration of the grant of mining lease. The writ petitioner sat tight over the matter and did not challenge the same up to 2003. This is on the face of it appears to be very serious. A person who can sit tight for such a long time or no justifiable reason, cannot be given any benefit. [Para 11] [583-E-F] Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. AND ANOTHER v. Dolly Das, [1999] 4 SCC 450 and M/s. Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur AND OTHERS etc., [1992] 2 SCC 598, relied on. 1.4. Rule 39 of the Rules was already repealed on 27.6.1996 and the ground reality had also changed. So far as grant of mining and mineral lease is concerned, no person has a vested right in it. There is no quarrel on the legal proposition that if certain rights have been decided on the basis of the law which was obtaining at that time, that will not nullify the judicial decision unless the bases are taken out. In the present case, the rule under which the writ petitioner sought direction for consideration of his application has already been repealed within the time frame directed by the High Court. Therefore the basis on which the order was passed has been totally knocked out. Rule 39 on the basis of which direction was given was not in existence. Therefore, it could not have been possible for the authorities to have acceded to the request of the writ petitioner. More so, no one has a vested right in mineral lease. [Para 13] [584-E-G] State of Tamil Nadu v. M/s. Hind Stone AND OTHERS, [1981] 2 SCC 205 and P.T.R. Exports (Madras) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1996] 5 SCC 268, relied on. K. Subramanian, E.C. Agrawala, Mahesh Agarwal, Rishi Agrawala, Varun Mathur, Gaurav Goel and Neha Aggarwal for the Appellant. K.K. Mani and R. Nedumaran for the Respondents.

Court rejected all the contentions of the appellant, at the same time we modify the order of the High Court to the extent that there shall be fresh demarcation done at the site through Patwari. On the basis of said demarcation, if i..

Court rejected all the contentions of the appellant, at the same time we modify the order of the High Court to the extent that there shall be fresh demarcation done at the site through Patwari. On the basis of said demarcation, if it is found that in the revenue record 30 feet road exists, that area will be clearly demarcated and delineated, and thereafter the Scheme would be implemented. The aforesaid exercise shall be carried out within a period of two months from today. The appellant shall be associated in the exercise of demarcation. Once this demarcation, is done the parties shall abide by the same. Appeal disposed of in the aforesaid terms

Insofar as the quantum of compensation is concerned, we are of the view that the three broad heads considered by the Division Bench for award of damages are sufficiently representative of the claim of the Plaintiff. The precise quantum of compensa..

Insofar as the quantum of compensation is concerned, we are of the view that the three broad heads considered by the Division Bench for award of damages are sufficiently representative of the claim of the Plaintiff. The precise quantum of compensation that should be awarded in any given case cannot and, in fact, need not be determined with mathematical exactitude or arithmetical precision. So long the compensation awarded broadly represents what could be the entitlement of a claimant in any given case the discretion vested in the trial court and the regular first appellate court ought not to be lightly interfered. Taking into account the facts before us and having regard to the basis on which damages have been awarded, we do not consider the same to be either inadequate or inappropriate so as to justify interference. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the Plaintiff is also dismissed. Consequently and in the light of the foregoing discussions, both sets of appeals are dismissed.

Held, it was not disputed that there was a legal relationship between the parties of a long standing - Section 44 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1996 applies to arbitral awards of differences between persons arising out of legal proceedings - Such..

Held, it was not disputed that there was a legal relationship between the parties of a long standing - Section 44 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1996 applies to arbitral awards of differences between persons arising out of legal proceedings - Such a relationship may be contractual or not, so long it is considered as commercial under the laws in force in India - Further, that legal relationship must be in pursuance of an agreement, in writing, for arbitration, to which the New York Convention applies - Court can decline to make a reference to arbitration in case it finds that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed - There were no pleadings to that effect in the plaint - Daman Trial Court findings that the contract was null and void and not based on free consent were rendered in the absence of relevant pleadings - Before the present Court it was not pleaded that the arbitration agreement was without free consent, or had been procured by coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation or was signed under a mistake - In other words, it was not claimed that the agreement was null and void, inoperative and incapable of being performed as it violated any of the provisions under Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 19A and 20 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 - Submission was that the matter cannot be referred to arbitration as the IPLA, containing the arbitration clause/agreement, was not a concluded contract - This would not fall within the parameters of an agreement being "null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed", in terms of Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 - These provisions set out the impediments, infirmities or eventualities that would render a particular provision of a contract or the whole contract void or voidable - 

Sale of agricultural land in contravention to law and procedure - Permission granted by the Collector, Bhuj, to sell certain parcels of agricultural land situated in district Kutch, which were said to have been purchased earlier by the Respondent ..

Sale of agricultural land in contravention to law and procedure - Permission granted by the Collector, Bhuj, to sell certain parcels of agricultural land situated in district Kutch, which were said to have been purchased earlier by the Respondent No.4 herein, for industrial purpose in favour of Respondent No.5 challenged as being impermissible under It was submitted that under Section 89A of the Tenancy Act, agricultural land can be permitted to be sold by an agriculturist to another person for industrial purpose provided the proposed user is bona-fide - In the event, the land is not so utilised by such a person for such purpose, within the period as stipulated under the act, the Collector of the concerned district has to make an enquiry under sub- Section 5 thereof, give an opportunity to the purchaser with a view to ascertain the factual situation, and thereafter pass an order that the land shall vest in the State Government on payment of an appropriate compensation to the purchaser which the Collector may determine - It was contended that there was no provision for any further transfer of agricultural land from one industrial purchaser to any third party, once again, for industrial purpose when the first purchaser of agricultural land had defaulted in setting up the industry - Apart from being in breach of the law, the transaction was stated to be against public interest, and a mala-fide one resulting into a serious loss to the public exchequer - Writ Petition criticised the role of the Collector and the Revenue Minister of the State Government, and sought an inquiry against them in the present case, and also a direction to the state authorities to resume the concerned land - Impugned judgment and order rejected the said writ petition on two grounds, firstly that there was delay in initiating the said Public Interest Litigation (PIL), and that the writ petitioner had suppressed the material facts before the Court concerning the investment claimed to have been made by the Respondent No.5 - Writ petition and now this appeal raised the issues with respect to the underlying policy and purpose behind the relevant provisions of the Tenancy Act, 1958 - In that connection, it also raised the issue with respect to the duties of the revenue officers on the spot, such as the Collector, the importance of the role of senior administrative officers of the State Government, and whether a Minister of the Government can direct the administrative officers and the Collector to act contrary to the provisions and policy of the statute - Secretary of the Department of Revenue of the Government of Gujarat, and the Collector of District Kutch at Bhuj were joined as Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to this appeal - Held, Whether the decision taken by the Government to permit the transfer of the agricultural land from respondent No. 4 to respondent No. 5, was legal and justified - Held, where the purchaser fails to start the industrial activity as stipulated above, Section 89A (5) requires the Collector to hold an enquiry, wherein he has to give the purchaser an opportunity of being heard - Thereafter, if he confirms such a view, he is expected to pass an order that the land shall vest in the Government which will, however, be done after determining appropriate compensation payable to the purchaser, which has to be done having regard to the price paid by the purchaser - Then the land shall be disposed of by the Government having regard to the use of the land - It is only in the event of his refusing to give the certificate of purchase for bonafide industrial purpose that an appeal lies to the State Government - Thus, where one wants to purchase agricultural land for industrial purposes, one has to first obtain the permission of the Industries Commissioner - Purchaser has also to inform the Collector about the purchase within 30 days of such purchase, and obtain a certificate that the land is purchased for a bonafide industrial purpose - He has to see to it that the industrial activity starts in three years from the date of such certificate, and the production of goods and services also starts within five years thereof, which period can be extended by the State Government, in an appropriate case - In the event the purchaser fails to commence such industrial activity, the Collector has to make an enquiry, and thereafter pass an appropriate order of resumption of the land on determining the compensation - Thus, the entire authority in this behalf is with the Collector and none other - Whereas Sections 89 and 89A contemplate a certain procedure and certain requirements, what was done in the present matter was quite different - State Government is an Appellate Authority under sub-section 3 of Section 89A, and it could not have given a direction to the Collector who was supposed to take the decision under his own authority - Present case was held to be clearly a case of dictation by the State Government to the Collector - State cannot ignore the policy intent and the procedure contemplated by the statute - In the instant case, the State could have acquired the land, and then either by auction or by considering the merit of the proposal of Respondent No.5 allotted it to Respondent No.5 - Assuming that the application of the Respondent No 5 was for a bona-fide purpose, the same had to be examined by the industrial commissioner, to begin with, and thereafter it should have gone to the collector - After the property vests in the Government, even if there were other bidders to the property, the collector could have considered the merits and the bona-fides of the application of Respondent No. 5, and nothing would have prevented him from following the course permissible under the law - It is not merely the end but the means which are of equal importance, particularly if they are enshrined in the legislative scheme - Minimum that was required was an enquiry at the level of the Collector who is the statutory authority and dictating him to act in a particular manner on the assumption by the Minister that it is in the interest of the industrial development would lead to a breach of the mandate of the statute framed by the legislature - Ministers are not expected to act in this manner and therefore, this particular route through the corridors of the Ministry, contrary to the statute, cannot be approved - Present case was clearly one of dereliction of his duties by the Collector and dictation by the Minister, showing nothing but arrogance of power - Impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court - Relevant direction of the State Government and the consequent order issued by the Collector of Kutch on held to be arbitrary, and bad in law for being in violation of the scheme and the provisions of Sections 89 and 89A of the Tenancy Act - Collector to proceed in accordance with Section 89A(5) viz., to hold an enquiry to decide whether the purchaser viz. Indigold had failed to commence the industrial activity and the production of goods and services within the period specified - In the instant case, there was no need of any such direction to hold an enquiry, in view of the letter of Indigold itself wherein, it clearly stated that they were no more interested in putting up any industrial project in the said land - Consequently, the land to vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances - This vesting order, however, has to be on payment of appropriate compensation to the purchaser as the Collector may determine - Appeal allowed in part and the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court was set-aside